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Opinion

Where is Canada in
the South Caucasus?
Beyond the
immediate
compromised
situation into which
Canada stumbled over
arms sales, Canada
should also have been
able to play a more
constructive role in
the security dynamics
in the region over the
last decades.

Christopher Waters
Opinion

I

n a rare visit to Georgia by a
high-level Canadian official in
the late 1990s, the Speaker of the
Senate attended an official banquet in Tbilisi hosted his Georgian counterpart. The banquet
was unusually short by Georgian
standards, a country famed for
its joyous feasts (or supras) of
multiple courses, speeches, and
toasts. The Speaker’s Georgian
host was welcoming, but his
remarks were also unusually short. The blunt gist of his
speech was: “Where is Canada?”
Canada had minimal presence
or interest in Georgia—or the
other countries of the South
Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan—in the waning days of the

20th century. Although having
recognized all three countries after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, no Canadian embassies
were established in the region,
high-level diplomatic visits were
rare, and economic or cultural
outreach was minimal.
More than two decades later,
that remains largely, and disappointingly, true. No Canadian
diplomats are stationed in the
region; the Canadian embassy
in Ankara handles Georgia and
Azerbaijan and our embassy in
Moscow is responsible for Armenia. With deadly consequences, Canada’s lack of presence
or interest in the region was
highlighted in the war between
Armenia and Azerbaijan last
fall over Nagorno-Karabakh. As
has been documented elsewhere—and as I and others have
suggested before the House of
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee—Canadian-made sensors
sold to Turkey were improperly
transferred to Azerbaijan and
used in drone attacks which
may well have been a game
changer in the conflict. Canada,
correctly if belatedly given its
commitments under the Arms
Trade Treaty, suspended, and
last month cancelled, the arms
export permits to Turkey.
Canada should have been
able to rely on its own reading
of the regional dynamics in the
first place to have understood—
in advance—where Canadian
arms would likely end up, despite Turkey’s end user assurances to the contrary, for authoritarian Turkey and Azerbaijan
are close allies and Turkish arms
transfers to Azerbaijan had
been steadily increasing in the
months before the war.
Beyond the immediate compromised situation into which
Canada stumbled over arms sales,
Canada should also have been
able to play a more constructive
role in the security dynamics in
the region over the last decades,
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including with respect to the
conflicts over South Ossetia
and Abkhazia as well as Nagorno-Karabakh. The region is
strategically significant—between
Turkey and Russia with Iran and
even China as emerging players,
energy resources, important trade
routes—and there are many good
reasons for Canada to be there
in terms of its commitments to
multilateralism and international
peace and security.
Canada also has a significant cultural connection to the
region. Although only small
numbers of Canadians are of
Georgian or Azeri descent, the
Armenian diaspora in Canada is
historic and significant. Furthermore, the potential for increased
trade, although currently quite
modest and dropping (less than
$100-million in 2020), is significant—extending far beyond the
excellent Georgian wines which
can now be found on Canadian
shelves. The region has high
standards of education and there
should be excellent opportunities for academic exchanges and
international student recruitment for Canadian universities
seeking to diversify the source
countries of international
students and enrich our campuses. (However, even before
the pandemic, efforts to promote
academic exchanges were met
with interminable visa process-

ing delays and arbitrary denials
by Canadian officials.)
In an ideal world, Canada
would have proper embassies
in all three countries, just as all
three South Caucasian countries
have embassies in Canada. Although this may not be feasible
in the short term, there is no
reason why Canada cannot have
some form of permanent diplomatic presence in the region
(aside from honorary consuls).
This could take the form of
satellite offices of the Moscow
and Ankara embassies, adopting the model used by Canada’s
embassy to the Baltic countries.
(While the Embassy itself is
located in Riga, Latvia, there
are embassy offices in Tallinn,
Estonia, and Vilnius, Lithuania.)
Or, perhaps Canada could have
one embassy in “neutral” Georgia
to be responsible for the region.
We are on record, after all, as
supporting Georgia’s eventual
membership in NATO. Simply
put, the “where is Canada?” model works for no one.
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